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1. A Confusing Notion 
Informally and on occasions formally, the notion of 
person seems to be indispensable in many walks of life. In 
philosophical debates, though, the notion oftentimes 
appears to play a subordinate role. Other notions--subject, 
self, individual, human being, or characteristic marks of 
persons: mind, consciousness, rationality, (individual or 
cultural) identity, autonomy, authenticity, responsibility--
occupy center stage. There are exceptions: there is the 
venerable problem of personal identity through time; in 
certain ethical issues, e.g., in bioethics or political 
philosophy, conceptions of person figure explicitly; and 
there are some treatises of the "concept of person" itself. 
Yet, even here one can hear warnings, e.g., that the 
concept is fraught with dilemmas and should be avoided in 
bioethical debates (Birnbacher 1997), or warnings 
concerning the "vagueness" (Wils 1997, 37) or the 
"contemporary crisis" of the concept (Kobusch 1997, 
263ff.).  
The sciences, in turn, seem to have little use for 
the notion of person itself. Exceptions may be psychology, 
neurophysiology or evolutionary biology. But in their 
studies of conscious phenomena, e.g., they again only 
touch on characteristics of persons. Theological studies, I 
should add, presumably cannot do without the concept of 
person; also, we know that the question of divine trinity 
was influential in the rise of the notion of person in 
Western thought (cf. Gunton 1996, 639).  
What are the systematic, especially conceptual or 
semantic, reasons for the rather confusing situation 
sketched above (for which there surely are intricate 
historical reasons)? This is my general question. Further, 
is this situation due to certain peculiarities of our notion of 
person - possibly reflecting the peculiar nature or, 
theologically, the “mystery” of the human person (cf. 
Kirschenmann 2001, ch. 13)? 
Perhaps, we can only have particular concepts of 
a person, geared to particular issues or contexts? 
Regarding ethical issues, for example, the concept of 
person in political philosophy might always differ from the 
concept of person in medical-ethical issues (abortion, 
euthanasia) and again from the concept of person that 
might be relevant in bioethics. Are there possibly 
irresolvable tensions between such particular issue-
dependent concepts? Is a general notion of person then 
pre-theoretical, eluding any attempt at theoretically 
conceptualizing it? Should we just take it as a "primitive 
concept" in our practices of ascribing both mental and 
physical properties to people (Strawson 1959)? 
What one in fact encounters in ethics (and some 
other philosophical fields) are diverging and competing 
conceptions of persons, depending on diverging 
philosophical positions. Liberals conceive of a person as 
an autonomous being, an "unencumbered self", while 
communitarians regard persons as being constituted by 
their communal, social, cultural and historical relations (cf., 
e.g., Mulhall and Swift 1996). In bioethics, one position, 
opposing more traditional views, tends towards a 
conception of person as both Intensionally and 
extensionally distinct from the concept of human (cf. 
Ricken 1997), making it possible to regard also non-
humans as persons. In abortion debates, there are 
diverging answers to the question of whether the embryo is 
a potential person (cf. Reinders 1993).  
Implications of explicitly formulated position-
dependent conceptions of persons can be traced relatively 
easily. In this light, my questions suggesting that there 
should be one notion of person may appear absurd: there 
just are informal uses of the term, and there are diverse 
specified uses of it; and these specific concepts or 
conceptions pick out a few, prominent characteristics 
attributable to persons - as is especially clear in the case 
of the technical concept of  the “legal person”. I shall call 
such views 'criteriological views' of the notion of person. I 
would maintain, however, that especially disputes about 
diverging conceptions cannot be entirely disconnected 
from the question of a unifying notion of person, possibly 
capturing the nature of persons. Hence, the problem of 
accounting for the situation sketched remains. 
   
2. A Suggestion Dismissed 
One suggested answer might be that our notion of 
person is a rather mixed notion, intending to capture both 
common characteristics and the unique individuality of 
human beings. (These intentions can be attributed, 
respectively, to the Greek-Roman and the Judeo-Christian 
roots of the notion.) Thus, our conceptual, semantic 
uncertainties about the notion might stem from our 
wavering between these two intentional aspects. 
We rely (tacitly) on general characteristics of 
human beings, maybe just on their unity and thus on their 
being units of their kind, when we simply state, for 
instance, that there is one person in the room. The other 
intention is perhaps be best brought out in adverbial and 
adjectival usages: we state sometimes what we 
“personally” think and did or that we know someone 
“personally”. 
The suggestion could explain the absence of the 
notion in the sciences: they are at best concerned with 
general characteristics. Theology, however, cannot avoid 
speaking of personal relations. Philosophy, again, primarily 
deals with certain general characteristics (subjectivity, self-
consciousness), thus mostly adopting criteriological views. 
Different concepts of persons in ethical fields could 
become plausible: political philosophy is about certain 
general characteristics (freedom, autonomy), while the 
issue of euthanasia requires attention to the uniqueness of 
persons. 
Yet, this suggested answer faces objections.  
(A) Material things are unique, too.  
(B) If concrete uniqueness is to be stressed, why 
not turn to the most unique elements, 
particular experiences, as done in Lockean 
conceptions (with personal identity becoming 
highly problematic). 
(C) Uniqueness (paradoxically?) is itself a 
general characteristic.  




(D) In ethics, we much rather have different 
approaches: rule ethics concerned with 
general characteristics of people and actions, 
contrasted with care ethics stressing people's 
particular circumstances.  
(E) At least one other reason explains the 
absence of the notion in the sciences better: 
it at once is a normative or dignifying notion, 
methodologically not falling within the purview 
of the sciences. At least, it expresses 
respectfulness, while a "scientist" will count 
just human beings. More is at issue when 
being considered a person or not may decide 
about one's right to life. Typically, too, we 
take a person to be a moral agent, capable of 
entering into binding agreements or being 
accountable for his deeds.  
 
3. A Normative-Descriptive Notion 
So, the notion of person should rather be 
considered a mixture of descriptive and normative, 
evaluative or prescriptive components—although such 
normative ascriptions as the 'dignity of the human person', 
in contradistinction to the ‘dignity of man’, may foremost 
concern the uniqueness persons. Part of the elusiveness 
of the notion is certainly due to that problematic mixing 
relationship. 
The descriptive components, of course, should 
provide conditions of application of the notion and grounds 
for its normativity. Yet, there are conceptual dangers. A 
naturalistic, e.g. neurophysiological, characterization of 
human beings might provide no adequate basis for our 
self-consciousness and accountability (cf. Wils 1997, 30). 
Conversely, a stress on the normativity of the notion might 
neglect or bias its descriptivity (cf. Birnbacher 1997, 11; 
Wils 1997, 30). Descriptive uses may be crypto-normative 
(cf. Birnbacher 1997, 24). 
In what follows, I shall mainly investigate to what 
extent the descriptive components of the notion can 
already account for its elusiveness, even though its 
normativity and their interrelationship are most 
controversial. 
 
4. Descriptive Elusiveness 
Older conceptions of persons, philosophical and 
theological, used to indicate that descriptive core of the 
notion in terms of an essence of a person. Think of 
Boethius' definition "Persona est naturae rationabilis 
individua substantia". 
In modern, anti-essentialist, times, it has become 
more uncertain how the notion of a person should be 
"positioned" in semantic and other respects (cf. Wils 1997, 
38). The descriptive components have since been put in 
terms of features of human subjectivity: cognitive 
capacities--intentionality, self-consciousness, 
transcendence of the presence, rationality; and moral 
capacities--responsibility, critical self-evaluation, autonomy 
(cf. Birnbacher 1997, 13). Clearly, some characteristics 
state minimal, others ideal conditions. Philosophers have 
selected--and ontologically elevated—different ones, 
engendering different criteriological views of the notion of 
person.   
If one does not want to just follow some traditional 
approach and its particular ontological answer, one can 
turn to more or less phenomenlogical characterizations of 
persons. In this regard, persons appear to be unified 
centers of all their acts - physical, social and primarily 
mental - and bearers of values and disvalues. As N. 
Hartmann (1933, 108) stated it:  
Im Leben pflegen wir diese Einheit des geistigen 
Einzelwesens als "Person" zu bezeichnen. Wir 
unterscheiden sie damit schon im Alltag von der Sache, 
dem Organismus, ja dem Seelenleben und dem 
Bewusstsein. Unter Personen verstehen wir die 
menschlichen Individuen, sofern sie als handelnde, 
redende, wollende und strebende, als Vertreter ihrer 
Meinungen, Einsichten, Vorurteile, als Wesen mit 
Ansprüchen, Gesinnungen und Wertungen im 
Zusammenleben mit anderen ebensolchen menschlichen 
Individuen dastehen und deren Behandlung, Äusserung, 
Wollen und Streben erfahren, ihren Meinungen, 
Einsichten, Vorurteilen begegnen, zu ihren Ansprüchen, 
Gesinnungen und Wertungen irgendwie Stellung nehmen. 
A comparable circumscription of a "concept of 
person" is given by what D. Wiggins (1987, 68) calls his 
"neo-Lockean account" of personhood:  
x is a person if x is an animal falling in the 
extension of a kind whose typical members perceive, feel, 
remember, imagine, desire, make projects, move 
themselves at will, speak, carry out projects, acquire a 
character as they age, are happy or miserable, are 
susceptible to concern for other members of their own or 
like species....conceive of themselves as perceiving, 
feeling, remembering, imagining, desiring, making projects, 
being susceptible of concern for others..., who have and 
conceive of themselves as having a past accessible in 
experience - memory - and a future accessible in 
intention.... 
Given such characterizations, what kind of notion 
is the notion of person then descriptively, and do its 
descriptive peculiarities provide reasons for its 
elusiveness? There at least are two noteworthy points not 
captured by criteriological views of the notion. One is that 
the notion is open-ended, as Wiggins emphasized and 
indicated by those dots. Hartmann (ibid.), too, stated that 
the weight of the characterization fell on the plenitude of 
mutual relations. This could explain part of the elusiveness 
of the notion. One would ask, however, whether such 
characterizations could not be brought to a close; for, 
clearly, this open-endedness is not without some definite 
directedness (an issue to which I shall return). By the way, 
this open-endedness can shed light on the problem of 
personal identity (cf. Brüntrup und Gillitzer 1997): the 
open-ended characterizations are gradualist, whereas 
identity is not gradual. 
Another point is related to the simple question of 
why, next to the notion of person, we also have those of 
man and human being and others. Normatively speaking, 
should we indeed distinguish between the ‘dignity of the 
person’ and the ‘dignity of man’? The characterizations 
quoted provide clues for an answer: the notion of person 
considers human beings in certain respects (indicated by 
Hartmann by "sofern", and by Wiggins by his strategy of 
characterizing a "concept of person" and not the nature of 
persons). Surely, we also use it as a plain discriminating 
notion, when we distinguish persons from things. Yet, 
above all, it is a correlative notion: it expresses our 
involvement with matters of all kinds and, foremost, with 
other persons, though also with ourselves.  
One can mention a third point. Clearly, the acts 
and activities referred to in the characterizations quoted 
are things that persons can do ("typically" do, according to 
Wiggins), but do not do all the time. As in many traditional 
accounts and thus already in many criteriological views of 




the notion of person, the emphasis is on capacities, not on 
actual performances. This circumstance surely adds a 
particular openness to the notion. And it requires subtle 
considerations of potentialities, well-known from the 
debates about abortion.    
Concerning the fist two points mentioned, Wiggins 
(1987) proposes that the relation between 'human being' 
and 'person' should be conceived of as that between 
'Venus at dawn' and 'Venus at dusk'. People have had 
different conceptions thereof, those of evening star and 
morning star, or those of Hesperus and Phosphorus. 
Likewise, we have different conceptions of the concepts of 
person and human being. The analogy is meant to 
suggest, not only a way of continuing the task of 
characterizing what a person is, but also its direction and 
goal. The goal, for him, is the convergence of the two 
conceptions, since the two concepts ultimately have the 
same referents, men (in the sense of 'homines'). The way 
to approach this goal is by further interpreting what a 
person is for us, by coming to "understand what forces us 
to account that creature not only as a subject of 
consciousness and a subject of interpretation but also, 
consequentially, as an object of reciprocity, or (in more 
Kantian terms) as a member of the kingdom of ends" 
(Wiggins 1987, 70). 
 
5. Conclusion 
I would maintain that the open-endedness, the 
peculiar correlativity and the built-in potentiality of the 
notion of person can account for much of the situation 
sketched in the beginning. Whether we should follow 
Wiggins' proposal about how to continue and possibly 
complete the characterization of persons - which would 
mean adopting his particular conception of persons - is 
another question. If we adopt it, we will have ruled out the 
possibility of regarding animals as persons, although this 
need not prevent us from having moral consideration for 
them. (The question of the status of embryos might still 
linger on). 
While the diverse conceptions of person can thus 
be very influential or even decisive, for instance in ethical 
issues (if, e.g., one would also adopt the rule that only 
persons have a right to life), the conceptual elusiveness of 
what persons fundamentally are, remains - just as much as 
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